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Security, resilience and plugins
Security
The framework integrates several security layers:
- Tools:
ToolAccessPolicy(whitelist/blacklist/unrestricted) per agent, checked when a tool is attached to the agent;IPathValidatorfor path traversal protection,IUrlValidatorfor SSRF protection,HttpHeaderSanitizer. Tool names specified in YAML configurations are validated at creation time viaIToolRegistry; underOrkeon:CrewFactory:StrictTools(the runners' default) no unregistered tool can be assigned to an agent β the library default is lenient (skip + Warning). - File system: every framework I/O goes through
IFileSystemServiceβ mounts, per-mountFileAccessRights(Read/Write/Create/Delete), physical paths redacted from error messages; the Roslyn analyzerOrkeon.Compliance.Vfsforbids directSystem.IOin framework code (VFS compliance). Underneath,PathValidator(PathSecuritysection) refuses traversal, sensitive system paths and dangerous extensions. A built-in script extension (.sh,.bash,.ps1,.bat,.cmd,.vbs,.wsf) refuses every operation but a plain read, since reading a script is not executing it:file_read,grepor the hash ofindex_codebaseopen it, while a write, a creation, a deletion or ashell_commandpath argument that needs more than Read is refused; built-in binaries (.exe,.dll,.msi,.com,.scr,.pif) andAdditionalBlockedExtensionsrefuse reads too. Before that, the mount itself resolves every symbolic link or junction on the path, its own root included, and refuses a path whose real location leaves the mount: a link may lead anywhere inside its mount, never outside it nor into another mount (a link replaced between the check and the open is not seen). Settings:AdditionalAllowedDirectories,AdditionalBlockedExtensions,BlockReadsOfBlockedExtensions(defaultfalse;truerefuses the reads of scripts again),ResolveSymlinks(defaulttrue),MaxFileSizeBytes(default 50 MB),DefaultWorkspaceRoot. - Network (SSRF):
UrlValidator(Security:Urlsection) allows onlyhttp/https(AllowedSchemes), blocks private and loopback addresses (BlockPrivateIPs, defaulttrue) after DNS resolution (ResolveDNS, defaulttrue), refuses the ports of common internal services (22, 23, 25, 110, 143, 445, 3306, 5432, 6379, 27017 βBlockedPorts) and honoursAllowedDomains/BlockedDomains. It is consulted by the HTTP tool bases,http_api, the scraping tools,WebPageLoaderand the RAG web fallback. - Shell:
ShellCommandToolruns a read-only allowlist by default (ls,cat,pwd,which,grep,wc,echo,dir,type,where, andgitrestricted tostatus/log/diff/show); interpreters (dotnet,npm,node,find) and mutating git only come back withOrkeon:Tools:Shell:AllowInterpreters(RCE-equivalent; theSECURITYwarning is logged once per host, at the firstshell_commandcall, and states the confinement in force);Orkeon:Tools:Shell:AllowedCommandsreplaces the allowlist verbatim (and cancelsAllowInterpreters),Orkeon:Tools:Shell:ExtraAllowedCommandsadds commands to it β see Opt-in subsystems. A virtual path on the command line is resolved and checked by the VFS: Read for a command of the read-only list, every right (read, write, create, delete) for any other command and for its working directory, since the process may write there. What the process reaches by itself (a path inside a script) is held by the operating system: confinement is on by default (Orkeon:Tools:Shell:Confinement:Mode = Auto) β bubblewrap on Linux, Seatbelt on macOS, an AppContainer inside a Job Object on Windows β and off when the host runs in a container, which is the boundary there. The process sees the agent's mounts (read-only without Write), the system directories read-only, nothing else of the host and no network; a backend that cannot run fails the call, never runs it unconfined. Each agent run has one shell session, killed with the run (ADR-014, Shell confinement below). - Code:
RoslynCodeSecurityAnalyzer(ICodeSecurityAnalyzer) and theICodeSandboximplementations βDockerSandbox,HostProcessRunnerbehindLazyProbingCodeSandbox(Orkeon.Infrastructure.Sandbox) β for C# code execution bySecureCodeInterpreterTool.DockerSandboxrunsdocker run --rm --cap-drop=ALL --security-opt=no-new-privileges --pids-limit=β¦with a memory cap,--network=noneunless the request allows network access and--read-only(+ anoexectmpfs) unless it allows writes; the container still runs as root inside its namespace, without capabilities.HostProcessRunnerprovides no OS isolation, so the gate is fail-closed: without Docker, execution is refused unless the operator setsOrkeon:CodeSandbox:AllowHostExecution = true(RCE-equivalent β trusted code only). Other keys:TimeoutSeconds(30),MaxMemoryBytes(256 MB),MaxOutputBytes(50 000);Orkeon:CodeSandbox:DockerholdsImageName(mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/sdk:10.0-alpine) andPullImageOnStartup. - Data:
IDatabaseSecurityPolicy(Orkeon.Tools.Abstractions.Data) for SQL query validation in the relational database tools,PiiDetectorand the fiveIDlpInterceptorimplementations (tool output, delegation, log, memory, external output βOrkeon.Infrastructure.Security.Dlp). The DLP subsystem is opt-in (AddOrkeonDlp(), see Opt-in subsystems) - Output validation: the six
IOutputValidators (LengthValidator,FormatValidator,SchemaValidator,CompletenessValidator,ContentSafetyValidator,PiiDetectionValidator) form theOutputValidationPipelinethe execution orchestrator runs on a task's output when the task declares output expectations, with correction retries. - Encryption:
IEncryptionProviderwith an AES-256-GCM implementation (AesEncryptionProvider, sectionOrkeon:Encryption:Enabledβ defaultfalseβ,SecretNameβ defaultorkeon-encryption-key, resolved throughISecretProviderβ,KeySizeInBitsβ 256), applicable to any memory provider via theEncryptedMemoryProviderDecoratorβ nothing wraps a provider automatically, the host composes the decorator. Key rotation is opt-in (AddOrkeonKeyRotation()) - Secrets:
ISecretProvideris a chain βORKEON_<NAME>environment variables, then theSecretsconfiguration section, then, whenSecurity:Vaultconfigures them, Azure Key Vault (AzureKeyVaultUri), AWS Secrets Manager (UseAwsSecretsManager, with anIAmazonSecretsManagerregistered by the host) and DPAPI on Windows (DpapiSecretsDirectory);CacheTtlcaches vault reads.LogSanitizermasks secrets in logged LLM errors and exchanges. - LLM rate limiting: every model call of the host takes one lease of
LlmRateLimiter(RateLimitingsection:GlobalRequestsPerMinute,ProviderRequestsPerMinute,MaxConcurrentRequests,QueueLimitβ each with its default in the reference), at the entrance of its provider (RateLimitedLlmProvider, applied with the token meter): an agent's turns, the manager, the planner, the RAG pipeline, the judges, the cognitive memory, a script'sctx.llmβ never twice, and a call made inside another limited call takes none; embeddings are not counted. A refusal past the queue is retried five times on itsRetryAfter, then the call fails with the limiter's reason.AgentRequestsPerMinutecaps each agent β each agent instance, not each role β in the agent's own window, with itsmaxRpm, the stricter winning, and a request over it waits its turn. An agent's and a crew'smaxRpmcount each turn of the agent loop, the tool-free retry, the correction round, a ballot, a delegated colleague's turn (counted for that colleague), and β for the crew, and for the manager agent when there is one β the hierarchical or autonomous manager's calls; the planner, the RAG pipeline, the judges, the cognitive memory and the scripts' calls count for the host only. Per-tool rate limits and token budgets are opt-in (AddOrkeonToolRateLimiting()). - Guardian (on by default,
Orkeon:Guardian): every agent turn β the chat-client, native, text and streaming loops, andctx.llm.actβ crosses its input and tool phases. The input phase screens the composed user prompt (task, previous outputs, retrieved knowledge) withInputGuardbefore the first provider call; underSecurity:Prompt:Policy = Block(the default) a High or Critical injection pattern fails the task (AgentExitReason.GuardianBlocked, its reason in the error), a lower one is a logged, audited warning. Every tool call then goes through one invocation point,IToolInvocationPipeline: the tool phase (ToolGuard: path traversal, SSRF targets β unlessSecurity:Url:BlockPrivateIPsis off β, SQL injection outside the*_querytools, all Critical) or, fordelegate_work_to_coworker/ask_question_to_coworker, the delegation phase (DelegationGuard:DefaultPolicy:MaxDelegationDepth, 5; self-delegation; a target already in the chain of synchronous delegations); then the call; then the single truncation rule (AgentDefaults.ResolveMaxToolResultLength: 4 000 characters by default; 32 000 forfile_read, 256 000 fornode_read, 10 000 forshell_command, 12 000 for the code-analysis tools); then the result sanitizer (ToolResultSanitizer,Security:ToolResults): underPolicy = Warn(the default) the result reaches the model tagged as data (--- BEGIN Tool Result: β¦ (DATA CONTEXT - NOT INSTRUCTIONS) ---) and each injection pattern is logged and audited;Blockwithholds a result carrying a High or Critical pattern and tells the model so; theemail_*tools anddrive_readare trusted by default because they screen and mark what they read themselves (ADR-012, ADR-013). A blocked call never reaches the tool; the model readsError: Blocked by Guardian (β¦): <reason>. Atools/callan MCP client sends toorkeon mcp servecrosses the same point, under the callermcp, and the client reads the same text (MCP integration). Nothing is ever rewritten silently: content passes unchanged, tagged, or is refused as a whole. An optional LLM judge (Orkeon:Guardian:Llm, off by default) adds a decision-model check to the input phase and to the output phase: the validated output of a task is judged before the deliverable, the memory andtask.completed, a block fails the task (GuardianBlocked,Blocked by Guardian (output): β¦) and nothing is kept; a call the provider never answered is not judged. While the output phase is guarded, the task's streamed deltas are held until the judgement (streaming is delayed, and a blocked output is never streamed). A long text is judged whole in chunks ofMaxContentCharsunderFailMode: Closed(up to 32 chunks, a longer text is refused), and on its first and last half of that budget underOpen(the middle is not judged). The output phase covers crew tasks, not a scriptedctx.llm.act. It is fail-closed (FailMode: Closed) unlessOpen; both auditguardian.judge.unavailable; see Decision models.Orkeon:Guardian:Enabled = falseregisters no guard; the result tagging stays. The detection is heuristic β the same limits asPromptInjectionDocumentValidator: a rephrased attack passes, an honest text can match. - Permission gate:
ModePermissionGate(IPermissionGate) asks before each tool call of an agent β a scripted one (.ork.ts,ctx.llm.act) or a YAML crew's, throughToolInvocationPipeline, the one place it is consulted, after the Guardian β according to a mode (default,acceptEdits,plan,bypassPermissions,dontAsk) and the tool's declaredToolAccess(Read/Edit/Execute), read for each call throughIBaseTool.AccessFor(arguments)so a tool such asgithuborhttp_apiis a read for its read operations only (an MCP tool is a read only when its server is trusted,MCP:Servers:<name>:TrustAnnotations, and hintsreadOnlyHint). Trade-off:plananddontAsklet an outboundhttp_apiGET,HEADorOPTIONSwithout a body or a method-override header run without a question, and a URL can carry data out (a query string built from what the agent read), so those modes keep the workspace unchanged, not its content private β denyhttp_apiby a session rule, or keep it out of the agent's tools, where that matters; a call the mode asks about goes to the host's approval channel when it has one (orkeon-repldoes), and is refused otherwise; a crew agent declares its mode withpermissionMode:(elseOrkeon:Security:PermissionGate:DefaultMode,default); a call the gate answersaskwith no approval channel to take it (the host registers none, as the Discord bot does) is refused, never run; the delegation tools andorkeon mcp serveare not put to it, and neither is anything the forge runs for its assistant β every call of the forge's scripts,actcalls included, is exempt (this is deliberate: the forge acts for the operator who started it); off unlessOrkeon:Security:PermissionGate:Enabled = trueβ see Opt-in subsystems. It stays distinct from the Guardian: a call it allows then goes through the invocation point above. - Audit:
AuditLogger(Orkeon.Infrastructure.Security, sectionSecurity:Audit:Enabled,MinSeverity,EnabledCategories,RetentionDaysβ 90) with its sinks (Orkeon.Infrastructure.Security.Sinks:StructuredLogAuditSinkandInMemoryAuditSinkregistered by default,JsonFileAuditSinkfor a host that wants files underAuditDirectory). The trail is fed by the agent turn: aToolExecutionevent per tool call (tool, agent role, crew, task, outcomeSuccess/Failure/Blocked, duration β never the arguments), and aSecurityEventper Guardian block or warning and per injection pattern found in a tool result.ProvenanceTrackerlives on the RAG side (Orkeon.Rag.Validation) - Compliance:
NistComplianceReportGenerator(INistComplianceReporter,Orkeon.Infrastructure.Compliance). NIST reporting is opt-in (AddOrkeonNistCompliance())
What runs on its own, and what the host calls
AddOrkeonInfrastructure() registers the security components below; this is what each one
does without host code:
| Component | On the execution path? |
|---|---|
Tool resolution (StrictTools), ToolAccessPolicy, VFS rights + PathValidator, UrlValidator, shell allowlist, sandbox gate, output validation pipeline, LlmRateLimiter, secret chain |
Yes β enforced wherever they apply, with no host code |
GuardianPipeline (Orkeon:Guardian β InputGuard, ToolGuard, DelegationGuard), IPromptSanitizer (Security:Prompt), ToolResultSanitizer (Security:ToolResults), IToolInvocationPipeline, the audit trail |
Yes β every agent loop and ctx.llm.act run through them (input phase, then each tool call through the invocation point), and so does each tools/call of the MCP server (orkeon mcp serve); Orkeon:Guardian:Enabled = false turns the guards off |
Shell confinement (Orkeon:Tools:Shell:Confinement) |
Yes β on by default (Auto) outside a container; Mode = None turns it off (below) |
| Permission gate | Yes for scripts and YAML crews once enabled (an ask with no approval channel is a refusal) |
| DLP interceptors, NIST reporting, key rotation, tool rate limiting | Opt-in, and host-invoked once registered β see Opt-in subsystems |
The Azure AD and OIDC providers validate A2A bearer tokens (below); no other inbound authentication guard exists.
Tool resolution in YAML
When a Crew is created from YAML, each tool name in agents[].tools[] is resolved via IToolRegistry.GetToolByNameAsync(toolName). What happens when a tool does not exist depends on CrewFactoryOptions.StrictTools:
- Strict mode (
Orkeon:CrewFactory:StrictTools=trueβ the default fororkeon runand the runners):CrewFactorythrows, naming the missing tools and listing the registry's available names. No agent can operate with non-existent capabilities. - Lenient mode (the library default,
false): the tool is skipped with a Warning log and the crew loads without it β a host embedding the library that wants the guarantee must turn strict mode on.
Shell confinement
shell_command checks each command line against its allowlist and the VFS, then hands it to the
agent's shell session, which the operating system confines
(ADR-014).
Backends. Orkeon:Tools:Shell:Confinement:Mode is Auto by default:
| Platform | Backend | What the process sees |
|---|---|---|
| Linux | bubblewrap (bwrap --unshare-all --die-with-parent) |
the virtual paths: each agent-facing mount bound at its virtual path, read-only without Write, a sub path without rights covered; /usr, /bin, /sbin, /lib*, /etc read-only; its own /proc, /dev and /tmp (HOME and TMPDIR) |
| macOS | Seatbelt (/usr/bin/sandbox-exec -p <profile>) |
the physical paths, filtered by a (deny default) profile: the mounts read-only or read-write after their rights, the system directories read-only, the listing of / (the dynamic loader reads it), a scratch folder of the session as HOME and TMPDIR |
| Windows 10 and later | an AppContainer (one profile per session) inside a Job Object | the physical paths: the mounts granted to the container's SID by ACE (read and execute, or modify), a sub path without rights (or read-only inside a writable mount) cut off from the grant its parent passes down (its DACL protected for the session, then written back: the container's access check skips a deny ACE), what ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES reads (the Windows and Program Files trees); TEMP, TMP and HOME in the profile's own folder |
Off in a container.
Autoresolves toNonewhen the host runs in a container (/.dockerenv,/run/.containerenv,DOTNET_RUNNING_IN_CONTAINER=true) and logs it once; the images also setOrkeon__Tools__Shell__Confinement__Mode=None. An explicit mode is never overridden.Fail closed. A backend that cannot run (
bwrapmissing, user namespaces refused, Windows older than 10, a mode for another platform) fails the call with the reason and the way out (Mode = None); the command never falls back to running unconfined.The
SECURITYline. When the interpreters (node,dotnet,npm,find) are enabled, the tool logs oneSECURITYline, once per host, at the firstshell_commandcall validated, whatever the command: constructing or listing the tool logs nothing. The line states the confinement in force: the backend and what it shows the process; ornoneand why (the host runs in a container, orMode = None, where commands run on the host unconfined); orunavailablewith the reason, when every call will fail rather than run unconfined. A confining backend also states the network,network onornetwork off(fromConfinement:AllowNetwork), and bubblewrap addssystem directories are read-only. UnderMode = None, or unconfined inside a container, the line always saysnetwork on(the unconfined shell never cuts the network) and makes no read-only claim.No network unless
Confinement:AllowNetwork = true: a network namespace with loopback only under bubblewrap,(deny network*)under Seatbelt, no network capability under AppContainer.Session sockets. The shell's environment allow-list carries
XDG_RUNTIME_DIRandSSH_AUTH_SOCKwhen the host has them, andDBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESSunder the condition below. Each holds an address rather than a secret, but what it leads to is powerful: the ssh agent signs with every key it holds, and the session bus reaches every service of the operator's session. Under bubblewrap they follow only withAllowNetwork = true, and then only the socket files are bound read-write at their own path β theSSH_AUTH_SOCKpath and aunix:path=bus β when they exist and are no directory;XDG_RUNTIME_DIRitself is never bound. Without the network neither the variables nor the binds are given. Every other variable, the LLM API keys first, stays dropped.The session bus is opt-in. Through the bus a command runs
systemd-run --user sh -c β¦(or callsorg.freedesktop.systemd1withgdbus) and so executes outside the sandbox, andsecret-tool search --allreads every secret of the keyring. A confined session (bubblewrap, Seatbelt, AppContainer) therefore receives neitherDBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESSnor, under bubblewrap, the bus socket unlessOrkeon:Tools:Shell:Environment:SessionBus = true, which the host logs as a warning when it starts. Turn it on only for a trusted agent that needs a keyring-backed credential helper (gh auth git-credential,git-credential-libsecret); an ssh remote or a credential the operator hands over another way needs no bus. Aunix:abstract=bus is the exception bubblewrap cannot close: an abstract socket belongs to the network namespace, whichAllowNetworkshares, so it stays reachable to a command that finds its name, variable or not. An unconfined session (Mode = None, a container) and the code sandbox always receive the bus: no jail holds them, and they reach its socket inXDG_RUNTIME_DIRwithout the variable.Added variables.
Orkeon:Tools:Shell:Environment:Propagateadds host variables to the allow-list, for the shell session and the code sandbox alike. The code sandbox reads the key from configuration only: a list set in code withConfigure<ShellToolOptions>reaches the shell alone, sinceOrkeon.Infrastructuredoes not reference the shell's project. The secret filter wins over it: a name starting withORKEON_, containingKEY,TOKEN,SECRET,PASSWORD,PASSWD,PASS,CREDENTIALorAUTH, or holding the wordPATon its own (GITHUB_PAT, notPATH), without case, blank, or holding=or a NUL is dropped with a warning, and so is one whose value carries URL credentials (http://user:password@proxy:3128,https://<token>@host, or schemelessuser:password@proxy:3128, a/in the password included), the warning naming the variable and never its value; a built-in name is ignored. Names compare with case (http_proxyandHTTP_PROXYare two variables), except on Windows. The filter reads names and URL userinfo only: a value carrying a credential in another shape passes, so list only variables whose value is no secret. Under bubblewrap an added variable passes with or without the network, since only a socket needs it, and no path it names is bound: the view stays what the mounts andReadOnlyPathsmake it, so a variable naming a host directory points at nothing inside unless that directory is lent another way.Paths. Under bubblewrap the arguments are checked and passed virtual. Under Seatbelt, AppContainer and
Nonethey are translated virtualβphysical, and physical paths in the output come back virtual.Agent file-system scope. An agent that declares a file-system scope sees its entries alone: a mount no entry selects is not bound, and each entry is bound with the rights in force there (the mount's, narrowed by the entry), its sub-path overrides beneath it. Under a working root as well, the entries are clipped to the root. Unconfined (
Mode = None, or inside a container), the shell holds the scope only for the paths its command line names and its working directory, as it holds the mounts. A denial under a scope names the scope and no other mount; a listing gives only what a read would allow; the semantic-graph tools leave out the nodes of files outside it.Agent working root. An agent that declares a working root sees, of the mount that holds it, the root alone. When the root is a linked git worktree (its
.gitis a file,gitdir: <path>, written bygit worktree add), git commits through two directories outside it, which are bound after every other path of the mount so thatgit status,git addandgit commitwork there and commit on the worktree's branch:- the repository's common dir (
<main>/.git) read-only as a whole: itsconfig,hooks,info,modules, the other worktrees' git dirs, and anything created there later, are read by the user's own git in the main checkout, so the agent can neither change nor add them; - over it, read-write (capped by the root's rights and the rights in force there):
<common>/objects,<common>/refs,<common>/logs(each only when it is a directory, not a symlink; a repository withoutlogs/cannot record reflogs from the agent) and the worktree's own git dir (<common>/worktrees/<name>), which was already the agent's in effect since git in the worktree trusts the.gitfile of the root; - then the mount's overrides under these directories, each narrowed to the lesser of what it
grants and what the git rule grants there: an override narrows a git dir (a read-only
refs/headsstays read-only) but never widens one (a read-write override on the common dir leaves itshooksandconfigread-only).
Nothing is bound unless every check holds: the gitdir sits in a
worktreesdirectory and the common dir is its grandparent; itscommondirnames exactly that common dir; its back-linkgitdirnames exactly this root's.git(an agent cannot point its.gitat another worktree's git dir); both have the git layout; both lie on the mount outside the root and do not hold it; and no component of their path below the mount's root is a symlink, read through the VFS without following the last link (the VFS resolves paths lexically, while the kernel follows links when it binds a source). A gitdir, commondir or back-link may be relative (to the directory that holds the file;git worktree add --relative-paths, git 2.48 and later), a virtual path, or a host path under the mount's physical root (plaingit worktree add), bound at that host path. Anything else binds nothing and is logged at Debug. The checks run when the command starts; what a job of the same agent may write meanwhile lies inobjects,refs,logsor the gitdir, none of which is a component of the checked paths. Nothing else of the main checkout is bound: its working tree stays out of reach. The three backends take these paths from the same list and give a read-only parent with read-write children the same rights: bubblewrap binds deeper paths last, Seatbelt writes them last (its last matching rule wins), AppContainer grants Modify on the children over an inherited read-and-execute.- the repository's common dir (
Jobs.
action = start_jobruns an allowlisted command detached, with the same confinement as a blocking call, and returns ajob_idand the virtual path of its output file,/output/jobs/<id>.log(the first mount with Write rights when/outputis not writable; refused when none is).job_statusreportsrunningor theexit_code;job_tailreturns the lasttail_lineslines (a bounded read from the end of the file). A run holds 16 live jobs at most, a job id is valid for the run that started it, and the run's end kills the jobs still running. The>,>>,<,|,;and&operators stay refused in the command: the redirection to the log is the session's, by stream, never a shell operator.Windows commands. A program is looked up on
PATHonly (never the working directory, a mount the agent writes to),.exethen.com. A cmd.exe built-in (echo,dir,type) runs ascmd.exe /d /v:off /s /c "<built-in> <arguments>", every argument that is not a plain word between double quotes,%refused. This holds withMode = Nonetoo. A batch file (.bat,.cmd) is refused in an AppContainer session, since cmd.exe would parse its arguments again; withMode = Noneit runs (npmfindsnpm.cmdafter.exeand.com) ascmd.exe /d /v:off /s /c "<path> <arguments>", escaped as a built-in,%refused.
The session's life. The session is opened at the agent run's first command and bound to its
AgentRunScope; the run's later commands reuse it (each in a subshell, so cd or a variable
does not carry over), and it is reopened when the mounts change. Agents running side by side have
their own. It is killed with everything it started when the run ends, fails or is cancelled. A
command that times out, or a caller's cancellation, kills the session: the result says so and the
next command opens a new one. A command outside any agent run gets a session of its own, closed
after it. When the host itself dies:
| Backend | What takes the session down |
|---|---|
| bubblewrap | the kernel: --die-with-parent and the PID namespace, of which bwrap is the init β every process of the session, detached or not |
AppContainer, and None on Windows |
the kernel: the Job Object is KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE and the host holds its only handle; ACEs a crash left are recorded in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Orkeon\shell-sessions\ and taken back by the next host's first session |
Seatbelt, and None on Linux and macOS |
a watchdog shell (outside the sandbox under Seatbelt) that checks every second that the host still exists, then stops and kills the session's process tree and removes its scratch folder; a process that left the tree (a double fork) is not reached, and the watchdog itself is a process that a SIGKILL of its own ends |
Common settings (environment variables shown; the same keys go in appsettings.json):
- Turn it off:
Orkeon__Tools__Shell__Confinement__Mode=None. The process then runs on the host as the host's user, the VFS checking only the paths its command line names. - Install bubblewrap (Linux):
sudo apt-get install bubblewrapon Debian and Ubuntu (the Orkeon.debdepends on it). Ubuntu 24.04 and later restrict unprivileged user namespaces through AppArmor: an AppArmor profile for/usr/bin/bwrapthat grantsusernslifts the restriction for bubblewrap alone; without one the call fails with bwrap's reason, and the machine-wide way out issysctl kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0(what the nightly runner does). Check withbwrap --unshare-all --die-with-parent --ro-bind / / /bin/true. - Give it a toolchain outside the system directories:
Orkeon__Tools__Shell__Confinement__ReadOnlyPaths__0=/opt/node,Orkeon__Tools__Shell__Confinement__ReadOnlyPaths__1=/home/me/.dotnet(bound read-only at their own path; on Windows, fully qualified host directories the container may read and execute). - Allow the network (a package manager,
git fetch):Orkeon__Tools__Shell__Confinement__AllowNetwork=true.
Limits: Known limitations.
A2A mutual TLS
The opt-in A2A subsystem (AddOrkeonA2A()) enforces the security posture declared in A2ASecurityOptions:
- Server (
RequireMutualTls = true): an incoming client certificate is authenticated, not merely required β it must chain to one of the configuredTrustedCertificateAuthorities(X509 chain built withCustomRootTrust, which also covers the validity window) or match a pinnedTrustedClientCertificateThumbprintsentry. Self-signed certificates that are not pinned are rejected (403). Starting the server withRequireMutualTlsand no trust anchor throws (fail-closed): presence and date validity alone are not authentication. Revocation is not checked β the trust anchors are assumed to be private CAs without CRL/OCSP endpoints. - Client: full TLS validation always applies β there is deliberately no accept-any-certificate opt-out. Configuring
TrustedCertificateAuthoritiespins trust to private CAs (a self-signed or local-dev server must pin its CA this way); the pinning only vouches for an unknown chain (RemoteCertificateChainErrors) β a host-name mismatch or a missing certificate is never bypassed. - Credentials (
AllowedAuthSchemes): a declared scheme is validated, not just matched.Bearertokens are offered to the registeredIAuthenticationProviders βAzureAdAuthProvider(A2A:Security:AzureAD:TenantId,ClientId, optionalAuthority,ValidIssuers,ValidAudiences; signing keys from the tenant's OpenID configuration) andOidcAuthProvider(A2A:Security:Oidc:Authority,ClientId,ValidAudiences,RequireHttpsMetadata), registered byAddOrkeonA2A(configuration)for each filled section, or the host's own.ApiKeykeys (Authorization: ApiKey <key>) are read throughISecretProviderfrom the names inApiKeySecretNameson every request β never written in configuration β and compared in constant time. A rejected credential gets 401. Starting a server that declares a scheme without a validator throws (fail-closed, likeRequireMutualTlswithout a trust anchor); any scheme other thanBearerandApiKeyhas none. Client side,ClientAuthScheme(BearerorApiKey) andClientCredentialSecretNamemakeA2AClientsendAuthorization: <scheme> <secret>on every task call, the secret read throughISecretProvidereach time; a credential that cannot be read fails the call before anything is sent. - Real mutual TLS termination requires an OS-level HTTPS binding for
HttpListenerβ see Known limitations.
RAG web fallback & prompt injection
The corrective RAG pipeline can optionally fall back to a web search (WebSearchDocumentRetriever, Orkeon.Rag.WebFallback) when local retrieval fails. Web content is the textbook vector for indirect prompt injection: a page crafted so that, once retrieved and inserted into an LLM prompt, its text is interpreted as instructions β hijacking the agent, leaking the conversation, or triggering tool calls.
The defense is layered; no single layer is trusted on its own:
- Strict opt-in: the fallback is off by default behind two independent switches β the transport (
Orkeon:Rag:WebFallback:Enabled+ anEndpoint, registered byAddOrkeonRag(configuration)) and the corrective-graph policy (Orkeon:Rag:Corrective:WebFallback:Enabled); both must be on for a web document to ever reach the graph. Enabling it without configuring an endpoint keeps it inert and logs a warning β there is no silent egress. The API key is read from an environment variable (ApiKeyEnvVar), never from configuration files. - Deterministic validation: every downloaded page passes through
PromptInjectionDocumentValidator(Orkeon.Rag.Validation) β pure heuristics, no LLM, testable offline. Detected signals: model-addressed directives (EN + FR: "ignore previous instructions", "you are nowβ¦", "system:", Β« nouvelles instructions : Β»β¦), chat-template control tokens (<|im_start|>,<<SYS>>,[INST]β¦) with per-occurrence accumulation, hidden HTML markup (display:none,visibility:hidden, near-zero opacity/font-size,aria-hidden), massive HTML comments, exfiltration vectors (auto-loading markdown images with encoded query payloads, percent-encoded link payloads, base64 data URIs) and long base64 blobs. The per-document verdict isClean | Suspicious | Rejectedwith reasons and incriminated spans. - Traceability, no silent cleaning:
Rejecteddocuments never leave the retriever and are logged with their reasons and URL.Suspiciousdocuments are β perSuspiciousActionβ either discarded (logged) or kept flagged in metadata (injection_verdict,injection_reasons,injection_risk_score). Content is never rewritten: the validator detects, it does not sanitize. On the ingestion path the same validator sits in theDataValidationPipeline(IDataValidatorchain) with quarantine and provenance tracking. - Fail-quiet on the network, fail-loud on security: search HTTP errors and timeouts degrade to an empty result list with a warning (the corrective graph simply proceeds without web context); rejections are always warnings with full reasons.
Honest limits: these heuristics are pattern-based and can be evaded β paraphrased directives, languages other than English/French, novel encodings or split payloads will pass. Conversely, legitimate technical documents about prompts or CSS may score Suspicious (they are flagged, never silently dropped). A content validator is a filter, not a privilege boundary: the real containment is architectural β retrieved text must stay data (never executed as instructions), agents consuming web content should run with least-privilege tools, and sensitive actions must not be triggerable by retrieved content alone.
E-mail tools
The e-mail family (Orkeon.Tools.Email β guide) reads mail written by
strangers and acts on a real mailbox, so its defense does not rest on the model's judgment:
- The model only picks an account name. Servers, credentials and rights are the operator's
configuration (
Orkeon:Tools:Email). A secret is the name of an environment variable, never a value in that configuration, and never a tool argument β tool arguments are logged. - Rights are declared per account, and mandatory.
Read,Organize,Draft,Send,Delete,Purge: an account that declares none is refused, and every call is checked against the right its operation needs. Each tool also declares itsToolAccess(Read, Edit, Execute βemail_sendandemail_deleteare Execute), which is what the permission gate reads. - Sending fails closed.
email_sendreaches only the addressesSend:AllowedRecipientsallows (an address,*@domainor*; an empty list allows nobody), checked on To, Cc and Bcc by address, never by display name. The SMTP envelope is passed explicitly β the checked list, never derived from headers, so noResent-*header can widen it βFromis forced to the account, andSend:MaxRecipients/Send:MaxPerHourcap the volume. Over Graph, which reads the envelope from the headers, a message naming anyone outside the checked list is refused.email_draftis the human-review path: the agent writes, a person sends. - Received content is untrusted. Every search page and read result opens with a notice
that it is data, never instructions.
email_readandemail_parsercarry the verdict of the samePromptInjectionDocumentValidatoras the web fallback above, run on the rendered text β what the agent sees, not the raw HTML or MIME. Text the HTML hides from a human reader through the inline declarations the renderer knows (display:none,font-size:0β¦) or thehiddenattribute is left out and flaggedhidden_content; a CSS class, a 1-pixel font or white on white is not detected, and a plain-text part β what the agent reads when there is one β is not compared with the HTML. The default policy flags;Screening:WithholdRejectedwithholds the body of a rejected message. - MCP OAuth tokens never reach the disk or the log. An MCP server in
oauth2-client-credentialsoroauth2-deviceis signed in byOAuthMcpAuthenticator: the client secret is read from an environment variable on every token request, the access and refresh tokens are held in memory only, and the token endpoint is reached through theorkeon-mcp-oauthclient, which is kept out of the LLM exchange log. The secret and the tokens are scrubbed from every error and log line, even when the identity provider echoes them; a token endpoint must behttps(loopbackhttpexcepted).orkeon-hosthas no terminal and refuses the device flow (MCP integration). - Tokens stay out of the agents' reach. OAuth tokens are written by
orkeon email logininto the internal root/credentials, mounted only when an OAuth account is declared and reached throughPrivilegedFileSystemAccess, which no agent-facing tool resolves (VFS compliance). The tools never start an interactive sign-in, and a Graph paging link is followed only while it still points atgraph.microsoft.comover HTTPS, so the bearer token never leaves for another host. Transport is TLS (SslOnConnectorStartTls) βNoneis accepted towards a loopback test server only, and no option accepts an invalid certificate. - Forged crews are tried on a fictitious mailbox.
orkeon forgeoffers the twelve mailbox tools, and its bench runs every try inside a mail trial: the tools read and change a trial mailbox, a send is recorded and never leaves, and the configured account's rights, allow-list and caps already judge each simulated action.
Honest limits. The screen is the pattern-based detector described above: it flags, and a
paraphrased injection passes it. The boundary is the account's rights, the fail-closed
allow-list and drafts. Every account is visible to every crew and every .ork.ts script that
resolves the same settings file β scripts call tools.email* directly, and the crews hosted
by orkeon-host share the host's settings β so declare accounts in the crew's own
appsettings.json (a run resolves one settings file; keep accounts out of an
appsettings.json in the directory runs start from and out of Orkeon__Tools__Email__β¦
environment variables, which the .NET host reads for every run), grant the fewest rights, prefer
email_draft, and do not give an untrusted crew both e-mail Read and an outbound channel
(http_api, the web tools): a message could ask the agent to carry the mailbox out. The token
files are plain JSON: shielded from the VFS tools, not from a shell or code tool running
as the same operating-system user.
Drive tools
The drive family (Orkeon.Tools.Drive β guide) reads and changes a real
Google Drive or OneDrive, whose files anyone the owner works with may have written or shared. Its
defense follows the e-mail family's:
- The model only picks an account name. The client, the secret's variable name, the tenant,
the rights and the root folder are the operator's configuration (
Orkeon:Tools:Drive); no credential is ever a tool argument. - Rights are declared per account, and mandatory β
Read,Write,Organize,Share,Delete,Purgeβ and each tool declares itsToolAccess(drive_deleteanddrive_shareare Execute). An account that only reads asks the provider for a read-only scope. - A root folder an agent cannot leave. With
Root, every item a call touches must descend from that folder β checked by its parent path on OneDrive, by climbing its parents on Google Drive β and an item outside is reported as not found, so the tools never confirm what lies beyond it. Search results outside the root are dropped. - Sharing fails closed.
drive_sharereaches only the addressesShare:AllowedRecipientsallows (an address,*@domainor*; an empty list allows nobody), sends no notification unless asked, and creates a link anyone can open only whenShare:AllowPublicLinksis set. - The trash first.
drive_deletemoves to the trash; a deletion for good needsPurge. - Read content is untrusted.
drive_readopens with a notice that the text is data, and carries the verdict of the samePromptInjectionDocumentValidator;Screening:WithholdRejectedwithholds the text of a rejected file.drive_readbypasses the result sanitizer because it marks its text itself; the names and metadata the other drive tools return go through it. - The token never leaves the API host. It is sent over HTTPS to
www.googleapis.comorgraph.microsoft.comonly: a OneDrive download goes through the pre-authenticateddownloadUrlwithout it, an upload session receives the bytes without it, and a paging cursor that does not point at Graph is refused. Tokens are written byorkeon drive logininto thedrivesubdirectory of the internal root/credentials(VFS compliance). - Forged crews never touch a drive.
orkeon forgeremoves the eleven drive tools from the catalogue: there is no trial drive yet.
Honest limits. The screen flags, and a paraphrased injection passes it; the boundary is the
rights, the root folder and the closed share allow-list. Every account is visible to every crew
and script that resolves the same settings file β declare accounts in the crew's own settings,
grant the fewest rights, set a Root, and do not give an untrusted crew both drive Read and an
outbound channel (http_api, the web tools, drive_share). The token files are plain JSON:
shielded from the VFS tools, not from a shell or code tool running as the same user.
LLM keys: the settings file names the variable
A settings file never has to hold an API key: ApiKeyEnvVar, in Llm and in each
Llm:Profiles:<name>, names the environment variable that does, and the runner host reads it when
the configuration resolves no ApiKey β in the process environment, then, on Windows, in the user
scope (HKCU\Environment), read and never copied into the run's process, so what a run starts (a
shell tool, a stdio MCP server, the code sandbox) inherits no key it did not have
(configuration).
The reference may name any variable. A settings file is trusted configuration already: it
declares the stdio MCP servers whose command the runner starts, and it directs the key to its own
BaseUrl. A hostile file placed beside a crew could name another variable and send it to its
endpoint β and it could already do worse. Restricting the reference to the provider's conventional
names would refuse a variable an operator chose, against a risk the file opens otherwise. What the
reference does guarantee is discretion: no message, log line or orkeon doctor row repeats its
value β a key pasted into ApiKeyEnvVar by mistake must not reach a log β, they name its
configuration path (Llm:Profiles:z-ai:ApiKeyEnvVar). A value that cannot be a variable's name (an
=, a space, a line break) refuses the start, by its path; an ApiKey written as a ${NAME}
placeholder β which nothing ever expanded, so the text went out as the key β refuses it too. More generally Orkeon never expands a variable in a setting: a ${NAME} or %NAME%
reference in any setting it passes as written refuses the start, naming the path and never the value β
run exits 1, orkeon-host 78 (the list).
Resilience
ResiliencePolicies (Orkeon.Infrastructure.Resilience) holds the two Polly policies on the execution path:
GetLlmApiPolicyβ built byHttpLlmProviderBasefor every LLM provider: retries transient HTTP failures (5xx, 408, network errors) and 429. A rate-limit window the provider announces (Retry-After,retry-after-msor a reset header) is waited out in full when it is at mostLlm:MaxRateLimitWait(default00:05:00); a longer one fails the call at once. The retry budget isLlm:MaxRetries(default 10) on a ladder that is linear for the first two retries then Γ3, every wait of that ladder capped at 30 s. A call that hits the HTTP timeout is retried once, then fails naming the setting.GetRedisRetryPolicyβ exponential backoff (2^n s, 3 retries) on Redis errors (connection and timeout included), used byRedisMemoryProvider.
The LLM budget and timeout are set by Llm:MaxRetries and Llm:TimeoutSeconds; the Redis budget is fixed.
Checkpointing
A tool approval that outlives the process. With Orkeon:Checkpointing:Enabled, DurableToolApprovalChannel stands in front of the host's IToolApprovalChannel (or alone, when it has none): what the permission gate asks about a tool call becomes a persisted question of kind ToolApproval (ToolName, ArgsHash - a digest of the arguments, never their values -, choices allow, allow_for_session, deny) under the id <TaskKey>#<n>.<q>. A run with nobody to answer stops on it (waiting_for_input, exit 75) instead of having the call refused, and the answer given to --resume --input (or POST /runs/{id}/input) decides the call when the task is replayed; anything but allow and allow_for_session is a denial. A call made outside a task of a checkpointed run is asked of the host's channel, or denied: the gate still fails closed. The answer is matched by the id alone. POST /runs/{id}/input goes through the authorization of the other /runs routes.
CheckpointManager and ResumeEngine (Orkeon.Application.Services.Checkpointing) enable saving and resuming the state of crew executions. Useful for long workflows that must survive restarts.
What the state store holds. The state store (in memory, JSON files, SQLite, PostgreSQL) keeps the outputs of the tasks and the answers given to a human in plaintext: protect it as you protect the data the run handles (file permissions, database access). The error message of a failed run passes through the log sanitizer before it is persisted, so a quoted secret is masked; task outputs and answers are not, because they are the data the resumed run reads back. A checkpoint rebuilds a structured output only as the type the task declares (or a plain JSON type): any other type name found in the store is refused and the task runs again.
The execution states themselves (ICrewExecutionStateManager: status, progress, output) can also be persisted in the same state stores (IStateStore β in-memory, SQLite via AddOrkeonSqliteCheckpointing, PostgreSQL) for recovery after a crash. Opt-in via AddCrewExecutionStatePersistence(...) β or the Orkeon:ExecutionState:Persistence section, which only takes effect through the AddOrkeonInfrastructure(IConfiguration) overload (the shipped runners use the parameterless one, so for them the explicit call is the route); default: in-memory only. See Opt-in subsystems.
Plugin system
IOrkeonPlugin, PluginAssemblyDiscovery, PluginLoader/PluginLoadContext and IPluginRegistry (Orkeon.Plugins) provide a plugin system for extending the framework with custom tools and providers: directory-based discovery through the VFS, isolated loading via a collectible AssemblyLoadContext, opt-in DI activation AddOrkeonPlugins(...).
β οΈ Trust boundary: loading a plugin executes arbitrary code with the host process privileges β no sandbox, and the
AssemblyLoadContextis not a security boundary. Only load trusted plugins. Details and operating rules: Plugin system.
See also: LLM providers Β· Events and CQRS Β· Back to index